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A six-wave 2005–09 national panel survey conducted in conjunction with the British Election Study
provided data for an investigation of sources of stability and change in voters’ party preferences.
The authors test competing spatial and valence theories of party choice and investigate the hypothesis
that spatial calculations provide cues for making valence judgements. Analyses reveal that valence
mechanisms – heuristics based on party leader images, party performance evaluations and mutable
partisan attachments – outperform a spatial model in terms of strength of direct effects on party
choice. However, spatial effects still have sizeable indirect effects on the vote via their inﬂuence on
valence judgements. The results of exogeneity tests bolster claims about the ﬂow of inﬂuence from
spatial calculations to valence judgments to electoral choice.
In recent years, two theoretical approaches have played prominent roles in research on
electoral choice. Spatial or positional accounts pioneered by Downs1 focus on the issue or
ideological proximities between parties and voters. The key assumption is that political
actors are distributed in a shared, possibly multidimensional, ideological-issue space in
which parties manœuvre in search of public support. In contrast, valence models, based
on the pathbreaking critique of spatial models by Stokes,2 emphasize the importance of
voters’ judgements about rival parties’ abilities to deliver salient and widely agreed upon
policy goals. Recent research conducted in Anglo-American democracies has shown that
valence models outperform spatial rivals in analyses of party choice.3 However, less is
known about the ability of spatial and valence explanations to account for changes in
party support in the ‘long campaigns’ between successive general elections. Much also
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remains to be learned about what occurs further back in the ‘funnel of causality’,4
speciﬁcally about relationships between spatial calculations and valence judgements. This
article addresses these topics in a study of factors affecting individual-level change in
party support in a major mature democracy, Great Britain.
The database for the article is provided by six waves of British Election Study (BES)
panel data collected between April 2005 and July 2009. These multi-wave panel data
permit us to compare the ability of valence and spatial approaches to explain individual-
level changes in party choice. Regarding direct effects, analyses demonstrate that valence
judgements play a more important role than spatial calculations in explaining why voters
change their party preferences over time. However, spatial perceptions are not irrelevant.
Although the direct effects of spatial thinking are overshadowed by those associated
with valence judgements, the closer a party is to an individual in spatial terms, the more
likely that person is to view that party as a credible government capable of delivering
sound policy outcomes. Spatial calculations thus have signiﬁcant indirect effects on party
support through their impact on valence judgements. The article is organized in ﬁve
sections. The ﬁrst outlines the core theoretical claims of the spatial and valence
approaches. The second discusses the political context in which the survey data were
gathered and brieﬂy describes signiﬁcant changes in key variables observed among the
BES panel respondents over the 2005–09 period. The third presents model speciﬁcations
and tests conducted to investigate the exogeneity of valence judgements in vote intention
models and spatial calculations in valence judgement models. The fourth presents results
of the empirical analyses. The ﬁfth summarizes principal ﬁndings and discusses their
implications for understanding the dynamics of party support in Britain and elsewhere.
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
Typical of good theories, the spatial and valence approaches to explaining electoral choice
are quite parsimonious. Spatial theory, inspired primarily by the work of Downs,5 asserts
that voters assess their own and competing parties’ positions on one or more ideological
or policy dimensions. Voters then maximize their expected utilities by selecting the party
that is closest to them in the space deﬁned by these dimensions. Although spatial analysts
differ in the precise ways they deﬁne and measure the effects of proximities between
parties and individuals, the core idea is that the primary determinants of party choice are
the relative positions of voters and parties in the relevant ideological or issue space.6
According to its advocates, a key strength of spatial theory is that the changing positions
4 Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, The American Voter
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960).
5 Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy.
6 See, for example, Bernard Grofman, ‘The Neglected Role of the Status Quo in Models of Issue
Voting’, Journal of Politics, 47 (1985), 231–7; Stuart Elaine Macdonald and George Rabinowitz, ‘Solving
the Paradox of Nonconvergence: Valence, Position and Direction in Democratic Politics’, Electoral
Studies, 17 (1998), 281–300; George Rabinowitz and Stuart Elaine Macdonald, ‘A Directional Theory of
Issue Voting’, American Political Science Review, 83 (1989), 93–121; Samuel Merrill and Bernard
Grofman, A Uniﬁed Theory of Voting: Directional and Proximity Spatial Models (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999); Stephen Ansolabehere and James M. Snyder, ‘Valence Politics and Equilibrium
in Spatial Election Models’, Public Choice, 103 (2000), 327–36; Anthony Heath, Roger Jowell and John
Curtice, The Rise of New Labour: Party Policies and Voter Choices (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001); James Adams, Samuel Merrill and Bernard Grofman, A Uniﬁed Theory of Party Competition
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of competing parties over time provide a compelling account of the short-term and long-
term dynamics of party preference change.7
In addition, spatial theory does not discount the possibility that there may be a
‘standing vote’.8 Rather than make a new, detailed assessment of the positions of the
parties each time they are required to make a party choice, voters may economize by
referencing their own past behaviour. Accordingly, they develop a habit of voting in a
particular way over time. This tendency to vote repeatedly for a particular party without a
de novo utility calculation presents itself in the form of what Campbell et al. called a ‘party
identiﬁcation’.9 For spatial theorists, party identiﬁcation – or partisanship – acts as a
predisposing stimulus which, over and above the contemporaneous effects of ideological
or issue proximity, encourages voters to support a particular party.10
Valence theory, motivated by Stokes’s inﬂuential critique of spatial models of party
competition,11 does not deny that individuals and parties can be located at different
points along various ideological and policy dimensions. However, valence theory suggests
that these differences are much less important than parties’ rival attractions in terms
of their perceived ability to handle the most serious problems that face the country.
In valence theory, what matters are comparative assessments of parties’ managerial
capabilities and their potential performance when attempting to deal with these problems.
Voters maximize their utilities by choosing the party that they think is best able to deliver
policy success in areas that concern them most.12 Valence theory also stresses the
importance of what is referred to as low-information rationality in political psychology.13
This means that, rather than incurring the relatively high costs of acquiring detailed
information about parties’ policy platforms, voters are ‘smart enough to know that they
are not smart enough’. In reaction, they use ‘fast and frugal heuristics’,14 that is, cognitive
shortcuts that facilitate making choices between or among parties.
Valence theory identiﬁes three principal heuristics that voters employ. The ﬁrst and
most straightforward is evaluations of party leaders. If voters have conﬁdence in a
particular leader’s competence, they use that impression as a cognitive shortcut and make
a positive assessment of the problem-solving capacities of her/his party. Similarly,
unfavourable competence assessments prompt negative views of a party’s problem-
solving capacities. Previous research has established that affect (like/dislike) scales are
very highly correlated with voters’ overall assessments of the characteristics of party
leaders.15 In this sense, the extent to which an individual likes or dislikes a particular
7 Similar to neo-classic microeconomic theory, spatial models assume that voters do not change their
preferences because of the actions of parties – individual ‘ideal points’ are exogenous.
8 Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy.
9 Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, The American Voter.
10 See, for example, James Enelow and Melvin Hinich, The Spatial Theory of Voting (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1984); Adams, Merrill and Grofman, A Uniﬁed Theory of Party Competition.
11 Stokes, ‘Spatial Models of Party Competition’.
12 Stokes, ‘Spatial Models of Party Competition’; Stokes, ‘Valence Politics’.
13 Samuel L. Popkin, The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns
(Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1991); Paul M. Sniderman, Richard A. Brody and Phillip E.
Tetlock, eds, Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1991); Arthur Lupia and Matthew D. McCubbins, The Democratic Dilemma: Can
Citizens Learn What They Really Need to Know? (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
14 Gerd Gigerenzer, Rationality for Mortals: How People Cope with Uncertainty (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008).
15 Clarke, Sanders, Stewart and Whiteley, Performance Politics and the British Voter, chap. 5.
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leader provides a simple affective heuristic for arriving at an evaluation of that leader’s
party.16
The second heuristic involves attitudes about which party is best able to handle the
most important problems facing the country. The problems that matter most in valence
theory are ones about which large majorities of the electorate are deeply concerned.
People overwhelmingly tend to occupy the same ideal point on these issues. A robust
economy characterized by high rates of growth and low levels of unemployment and
inﬂation is a classic example, but national and personal security and the delivery of
cherished public services, such as health care and education, also are perennially
important valence issues. If voters think that party X is the most competent to deal with
the issues that are highly salient to them at a particular point in time, then this view will
feature signiﬁcantly (and positively) in their voting choices. In contrast, parties judged as
incompetent to deal with salient valence issues are unlikely to receive support.
The third heuristic that valence theory emphasizes is party identiﬁcation. For valence
theorists, such identiﬁcations do not represent the standing vote of spatial theorists, or the
long-term political self-identities featured in social-psychological theories of voting
behaviour.17 Rather, for valence theorists, party identiﬁcations are a continually updated
‘running tally’ of the performance capabilities of competing parties.18 As such, they are
potentially more malleable than the habitual partisan attachments envisaged by spatial
and social-psychological theories. Previous empirical research has shown that partisan
attachments in Britain and elsewhere have a substantial dynamic that is consistent with
the valence account of party identiﬁcation.19 Given that spatial theory also claims
partisanship as one of its explanatory variables, we give spatial theory the maximum
opportunity to demonstrate its explanatory power by treating party identiﬁcation as a
variable that could feature in both spatial and valence accounts of party choice. However,
we also present evidence that partisan attachments manifest a sizeable dynamic consonant
with valence theory.
One additional point needs to be made about spatial and valence theories of party
choice. Both theories assume that voters are endowed with agency; they make decisions
rationally and typically on the basis of limited information. Where the theories differ is in
the complexity of the calculus voters are assumed to undertake. Spatial theory requires
recognition of the dimensionality of the ideological or issue space in which parties locate
themselves. Voters must place both themselves and competing parties in that space, and
then calculate the proximity between themselves and each of the competing parties. In
contrast, valence theory requires less cognitive effort. It merely requires a voter to judge
the relative merits of a very limited number of prominent individuals (party leaders) and
to assess the relative performance capabilities of the main alternative parties in an area
that the voter prioritizes. Given that people typically are not particularly interested in
politics and wish to minimize the cognitive burdens of selecting a party, we hypothesize
16 Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock, Reasoning and Choice.
17 On the latter, see, for example, Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, The American Voter.
18 Morris P. Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press, 1981).
19 See, for example, Clarke, Sanders, Stewart and Whiteley, Political Choice in Britain, chap. 5; Clarke,
Kornberg and Scotto, Making Political Choices; Harold D. Clarke and Allan McCutcheon, ‘The
Dynamics of Party Identiﬁcation Reconsidered’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 73 (2009), 704–28; Anja
Neundorf, Daniel Stegmaeller and Thomas J. Scotto, ‘The Individual Dynamics of Bounded Partisanship’
(unpublished manuscript, Department of Government, University of Essex).
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that the statistical explanations provided by the simpler valence mechanisms will exceed
those associated with their spatial rivals.
CONTEXT AND DATA
A brief review of events in the context of British politics illustrates the rival pressures exerted
by spatial and valence considerations on parties and voters between 2005 and 2009. The May
2005 British general election produced a third consecutive victory for Labour, albeit with a
considerably reduced popular vote and a sharply reduced number of seats in parliament.
Tony Blair had been a considerable asset for Labour in the 1997 and 2001 elections, but
by 2005 his image had been badly tarnished by Britain’s increasingly unpopular military
involvement in Iraq. However, the economy was still performing moderately well and
Labour’s social policies, particularly on health and education, were attractive to many voters.
In contrast, Labour’s chief rival, the Conservatives, had been unable to ﬁnd a leader capable
of mounting an effective challenge to Blair on the crucial competence dimension. The
Conservatives also had failed to bring their social policies in line with the preferences of a
majority of the electorate. As a result, the party fought the 2005 election with an unpopular
leader, Michael Howard, and right-of-centre policy stances on the economy, taxation and
crime not far removed from the Thatcherite orthodoxy of the 1980s. Circa 2005, the prospect
of a return to Thatcherism had precious little appeal.
The Conservatives’ third consecutive loss in 2005 prompted considerable introspection
in the party. The outcome was the selection of David Cameron as leader in December
2005. Cameron was young, moderate, ferociously supportive of the National Health
Service (NHS), and a good performer both on television and in the House of Commons.
He was determined to challenge Labour on the centre-ground of British politics. As
Figure 1 shows, under Cameron’s leadership, the Conservatives soon overtook Labour in
the opinion polls. With the sole exception of a one-month blip occasioned by the fuel
crisis of September 2000, this was the ﬁrst time that the Conservatives had enjoyed a lead
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Fig. 1. Monthly poll of polls, voting intentions for Labour, Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, May
2005–September 2009
Note: Monthly averages of the commercial opinion polls reported in the UK Polling Report at ukpollingreport.
co.uk/blog/voting-intention.
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in the polls since the Exchange Rate Mechanism debacle of September 1992. From the
autumn of 2007 onwards, Mr Cameron and his colleagues typically enjoyed a wide
popularity edge over Labour, and Conservative performance in local council elections
and by-elections improved commensurately.
For its part, Labour pressed Tony Blair to act upon his promise, issued in advance of
the 2005 election, to resign as prime minister at some opportune moment during his third
term in ofﬁce. He was duly replaced as leader in June 2007 by Chancellor of the
Exchequer, Gordon Brown. Brown’s ideological stance was virtually identical to Blair’s.
What Brown offered the party and the country was a solid reputation for competence in
managing the economy, a quality that he obviously hoped to extend to other areas of
government policy. During the summer of 2007, Brown’s reputation as a ‘safe pair of
hands’ helped Labour to re-establish a lead in the polls over the Conservatives. However,
the ‘Brown bounce’ was short-lived. The collapse of the Northern Rock Building Society
in September 2007 presaged the beginning of a serious credit crunch that by mid-2008 had
developed into a full-blown recession. As Chancellor, Brown frequently claimed that he
had ended the ‘boom and bust’ cycle that had plagued the British economy throughout
much of the post-Second World War period. The ﬁnancial crisis and deepening recession
thus presented a serious challenge to his government’s reputation for sound economic
management. As Figure 1 indicates, Labour’s poll ratings fell sharply after the Northern
Rock failure, while those of the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats recovered.
Although all three major parties suffered modest popularity declines in the wake of the MPs’
expenses scandal in the summer of 2009, the Conservatives maintained a sizeable lead over
Labour – averaging 12 per cent – throughout the period after the Northern Rock crisis.
In terms of illustrating the pressures placed by spatial and valence calculations on
parties and voters, the Conservatives after their election defeat concluded that they had to
move to the centre to attract more support. They duly moved closer to the median voter
by electing a self-proclaimed moderate, David Cameron, as leader. Cameron quickly
committed his party to protecting the NHS and maintaining strong public services.
Labour under Blair already occupied the centre ground. The supposed attraction of
Brown as his successor, as valence calculation implies, was that he would successfully
deliver on a range of commonly agreed policy goals. For their part, the Conservatives
under Cameron took every opportunity (and there were plenty after the Northern Rock
collapse) to question Labour’s competence – with some success, as the poll ﬁgures in
Figure 1 suggest. In sum, between 2005 and 2009 Britain’s two largest parties competed
for popular support on both spatial and valence grounds, and their relative popularity
ratings eventually were reversed. The period thus provides an excellent testing ground for
studying the relative strengths of spatial and valence theories as explanations for changes
in voter preferences.
Individual-level panel data are employed for this purpose. The data were collected in a
six-wave national internet survey conducted in conjunction with the 2005 British Election
Study (BES). The ﬁrst wave went into the ﬁeld in late March 2005, shortly before the
general election was called. Wave Two, using a rolling design to capture opinion
dynamics, was in the ﬁeld throughout the campaign period. Wave Three was conducted in
the week immediately after the election. Waves Four, Five and Six were carried out in
May 2006, June 2008 and July 2009, respectively.
Extensive comparisons of variable distributions and competing models of electoral
choice were conducted to assess the representativeness of the pre- and post-election panel
waves of the internet surveys. These comparisons used data gathered in the traditional BES
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in-person pre-election and post-election probability survey. Analyses revealed that the
internet and in-person survey samples were virtually and statistically indistinguishable.20 In a
vast majority of instances, model parameters calculated using the internet data were nearly
identical to those generated using the in-person data.
An analysis of the continuing representativeness of the post-election panel waves
focused on vote and vote intention percentages recorded for the three main parties. The
results are reported in Table 1. The table compares the vote shares for respondents who
remained part of the panel through all six panel waves with the actual 2005 election result
and the monthly average vote share recorded by UK Polling Report’s ‘Poll of Polls’.
Although there are some mild divergences from the actual result (for example, a four-
point over-estimate of Liberal Democrat support among panel respondents in 2005), vote
intentions reported by the panelists are very similar to those registered by the opinion poll
averages. This level of similarity indicates that the sample of continuing BES panel
respondents remained representative of the electorate’s political preferences over the
2005–09 period.
Individual-level changes in party preference among the panel respondents are displayed
in Table 2. The table shows the turnover between reported vote in the May 2005 general
election (Wave 3) and voting intention in July 2009 (Wave 6). In total, almost one person
in three (32.5 per cent) reported a different party preference. In terms of speciﬁcs, the
Conservatives garnered signiﬁcant support from both Labour and the Liberal Democrats,
making net gains of slightly over 4 percentage points from each of them. Sizeable gains
also were made by several minor parties (British National Party (BNP), Greens, Plaid
Cymru, Scottish National Party (SNP), United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)).
Between 2005 and 2009, these parties collectively gained slightly over 11 per cent from the
three major parties, while losing only just over 3 per cent.
TABLE 1 Comparison of 2005–09 BES Panel’s Party Vote Shares with the 2005
General Election Outcome and Subsequent Average Vote Intention Shares
Reported in Monthly Public Opinion Polls
May
2005
May
2006
June
2008
July
2009
Change
2005–2009
Outcome
Panel
post
Poll of
polls Panel
Poll of
polls Panel
Poll of
polls Panel
Poll of
polls Panel
Labour 35.2 35 31 33 26 24 25 26 210 29
Conservative 32.3 30 38 35 45 48 40 41 18 111
Lib-Dem 22.1 26 18 19 17 15 19 17 23 29
Other 10.3 9 13 14 12 14 16 17 16 18
Note: Figures reported are column percentages. Poll of Polls is the monthly average of the
commercial opinion polls reported in the UK Polling Report at ukpollingreport.co.uk/blog/
voting-intention.
20 David Sanders, Harold D. Clarke, Marianne C. Stewart and Paul Whiteley, ‘Does Mode Matter for
Modeling Political Choice? Evidence from the 2005 British Election Study’, Political Analysis, 15 (2007),
257–85.
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Figures 2–6 report changes in the three sets of explanatory variables that spatial and
valence theories hold to be primarily responsible for (changes in) party choice. The number
of time points varies across the ﬁgures because some questions were not asked in every
survey wave. Figure 2 displays the aggregate-level and individual-level dynamics of party
identiﬁcation. As noted above, party identiﬁcation is claimed as a signature variable by
both spatial and valence theories. Accordingly, we treat it as a distinct explanatory factor.
Figure 2a shows that identiﬁcation with Labour fell substantially – from 33.4 to 26 per cent.
In contrast, the percentage of Conservative identiﬁers in 2009 (24.5 per cent) was only
slightly greater than it had been four years earlier (23.9 per cent), and still less than Labour’s
share. The proportion of Liberal Democrat identiﬁers remained more or less constant,
oscillating around 10 per cent, a ﬁgure virtually identical to that which their predecessors,
the Liberals, had recorded in the very ﬁrst BES survey some four decades earlier.21
TABLE 2 Reported Vote in 2005 and Vote Intentions in 2009, 2005–09 BES Panel
Respondents
Reported vote, 2005
Vote intention, 2009 Labour Conservative Lib-Dem Other
Labour 21.6 0.5 2.7 0.6
Conservative 4.7 28.0 4.9 1.5
Lib-Dem 2.8 0.6 14.6 1.1
Other 4.6 3.0 3.5 5.5
Note: Percentages are calculated by dividing the number of respondents in each cell by the total
number (N5 4,015) of 2005–09 panellists reporting a 2005 vote and a 2009 vote intention.
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Fig. 2a. Trends in Party Identiﬁcation, March 2005–July 2009 BES Panel
Question: ‘Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat,
(Scottish National in Scotland/Plaid Cymru in Wales) or what?’
21 Clarke, Sanders, Stewart and Whiteley, Political Choice in Britain, chap. 4.
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Another part of the party identiﬁcation story is contained in Figure 2b, which
summarizes individual-level dynamics across the multi-wave panel.22 These data reveal
that less than half of the 2005–09 panelists (47.4 per cent) were directionally stable
identiﬁers. A further 9.9 per cent were stable non-identiﬁers. The large remaining group –
over two-ﬁfths of the panel – either moved between identiﬁcation and non-identiﬁcation
one or more times (25.5 per cent) or actually switched parties once or more (17.2 per cent).
As noted above, such sizeable individual-level dynamics are consistent with ﬁndings
reported in recent research and with the running tally conception of partisanship
articulated in valence politics theories of party support.
Figures 3 and 4 report changes in respondents’ self-placements and their placements of
the main political parties on two eleven-point (0–10) ideological scales that previous
research had shown to structure British political attitudes.23 These are, ﬁrst, a ‘cut taxes
versus improve public services’ scale, which reﬂects general attitudes towards the size and
function of the state and, secondly, a ‘punish criminals versus protect the rights of the
accused’ scale, which taps preferences for authoritarian versus liberal approaches to
maintaining social order while protecting human rights. Figure 3 illustrates how
respondents shifted their positions on the tax/services scale. High values indicate a
preference for more state activity; low values for less. From 2006 to 2009, on average,
BES respondents’ perceptions both of their own positions and those of Labour and the
Liberal Democrats moved slightly towards a preference for less state activity. Perceptions
of the Conservatives moved marginally towards greater state activity. The average
respondent also moved slightly closer to the average position assigned to the Conservatives.
Similarly, small movements occurred for self-placements and party placements on the
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Fig. 2b. Individual-level dynamics in party identiﬁcation, 2005–09 ﬁve-wave BES panel
Note: 2005 campaign, 2005 post-election, 2006, 2008, 2009 panel waves.
22 Since the 2005 pre-campaign panel asked the standard BES party identiﬁcation question of a random
half-sample only, we use the next ﬁve waves of panel data (2005 campaign–2009) to assess individual-level
partisan dynamics.
23 For discussion and analysis, see, for example, Clarke, Sanders, Stewart and Whiteley, Political
Choice in Britain, chap. 3.
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Fig. 3. Average positions on tax–spend scale, self-placement and placement of political parties, March
2005–July 2009 panel
Question: ‘Now, another issue. Using the 0 to 10 scale on this card, where the end marked 0 means that
government should cut taxes and spend much less on health and social services, and the end marked 10
means that government should raise taxes a lot and spend much more on health and social services, where
would you place yourself on this scale? And where would you place y the Labour Party y the
Conservative Partyy the Liberal Democrat Partyy ?’
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Fig. 4. Average positions on reduce crime–rights of accused scale, self-placement and placement of political parties,
March 2005–July 2009 panel
Question: ‘Some people think that reducing crime is more important than protecting the rights of people accused of
committing crimes. Other people think that protecting the rights of accused people is more important than
reducing crime. On the 0–10 scale, where would you place yourself on this scale? And where would you placey
the Labour Partyy the Conservative Partyy the Liberal Democrat Partyy ?’
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crime/rights scale (see Figure 4). Here, average self-locations became slightly less
authoritarian, as did perceptions of the three main parties. In both 2005 and 2009, the
average respondent clearly placed her/himself close to the ‘reduce crime’ end of the scale,
and was considerably closer to the perceived position of the Conservatives than to either
Labour or the Liberal Democrats.
Figures 5 and 6 report the 2005–09 dynamics in two key valence politics variables –
leader images and issue competence. The pattern of change in leader evaluations shown in
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Fig. 5. Average party leader affect ratings, March 2005–July 2009 BES panel
Question: ‘Using a scale that runs from 0 to 10, where 0 means strongly dislike and 10 means strongly like,
how do you feel about [name of party leader]?’
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Fig. 6. Party best able to handle most important issue, March 2005–July 2009 BES panel
Question: ‘As far as you are concerned, what is the single most important issue facing the country at the
present time?y Which party is best able to handle this issue?’
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Figure 5 indicates that from 2006 onwards the Conservative leader’s ratings were running
ahead of both the Liberal Democrats (who led in all three panel waves in 2005) and Labour
(who also led the Conservatives in the three 2005 waves). Clearly, the Conservatives’
replacement of Howard by Cameron made a big difference. Equally clearly, after enjoying
initial enthusiasm in the summer of 2007, Gordon Brown was considerably less warmly
received than Tony Blair had been in 2005 and 2006 when the British public had become
increasingly disillusioned over Britain’s involvement in Iraq.24 Circa 2009, Brown’s average
affect score was a dismal 3.1 points on the 0–10 ‘dislike–like’ scale. In fact, his score was
lower than those recorded by former Conservative leaders William Hague and Michael
Howard when they suffered serious electoral defeats in 2001 and 2005, respectively.
Figure 6 displays changes in judgements regarding the party best able to handle the
most serious problem facing the country. As shown, large pluralities (ranging from
32.8 per cent in the run-up to the 2005 election to fully 49 per cent in 2009) stated either
that there are no important issues or that no party is capable of handling them.25 Figure 6
also shows that the Conservatives were slightly ahead of Labour in the run-up to the
2005 election, although Labour regained a minuscule lead at the time of that contest.
Thereafter, the Conservatives moved well ahead, with the share of the electorate who
thought Labour best on the most important issue falling from 24.6 in May 2005 to only
11.2 per cent in July 2009. The Liberal Democrats were consistently in poor shape. Only
8 per cent viewed them as best on the most important issue before the 2005 election, and
four years later, merely 4.8 per cent did so.
To gauge the extent of individual-level change in perceptions of the party best on the
most important issue, we construct a turnover table using the 2005 to 2009 post-election
panel data. This analysis (not shown in tabular form) reveals that 29.2 per cent of the
panelists maintained a consistent view of which party is most competent on their key
issue. An additional 26 per cent consistently reported that no party was best, that they did
not know which party was best, or that there was no important issue. Most of the large
group (44.8 per cent) indicating instability in their party-issue performance judgements
moved between choosing and not choosing a party (33.4 per cent), with a smaller number
migrating between parties (11.4 per cent). Competence judgements on salient issues thus
exhibited levels of mutability consonant with the aggregate and individual dynamics in
party support discussed above.
In sum, the data reported in this section lend a priori credence to the claims of party
identiﬁcation, spatial position and valence judgements as explanatory factors in the
evolution of party support. Partisanship manifested clear aggregate-level and individual-
level dynamics, with the Conservatives improving their position relative to their
competitors, but failing (just barely) to overtake Labour. In terms of spatial positions,
the average voter saw her/himself as drawing closer to the Conservatives on the tax/spend
scale, while remaining much closer to that party than to its rivals on the crime/rights scale.
For the key valence variables of leader images and party competence, dynamism was the
watchword, with the patterns of movement placing the Conservatives well ahead of their
rivals. In the next section, we develop a series of individual-level models to gauge the
impact of these several predictor variables on the dynamics of party support.
24 Clarke, Sanders, Stewart and Whiteley, Performance Politics and the British Voter, chap. 4.
25 Overwhelming majorities of respondents did select an issue as most important – at least 99 per cent
did so in each of the six waves of the panel. Note also that the vast majority of issues selected are valence,
not positional, ones.
298 SANDERS, CLARKE, STEWART AND WHITELEY
MODEL SPECIFICATION
To assess the claims of rival spatial and valence theories as explanations of the dynamics
of party support, we use the maximum number of observations permitted by the available
panel data. Since the spatial measures described in the previous section were collected
only in a limited number of waves, this means that models incorporating the tax/services
scale (measured in Waves 1, 4, 5 and 6) can be estimated using four effective panel waves;
those incorporating the crime/rights scale (measured in Waves 1, 4 and 6) are estimated
using three waves.26 Since we are interested in the dynamics of party preference, we follow
Finkel and employ lagged endogenous variable models, measuring all predictor variables
in levels.27 The inclusion of a lagged endogenous variable on the right-hand side of each
model means that the reported coefﬁcients on each predictor variable effectively measure
the time t effects of that variable on partial changes in the dependent variable.28
To compare the effects of spatial calculations and valence judgments on party support, we
follow standard practice and employ statistical controls for a range of other variables that
might inﬂuence vote choice. Consonant with recent research,29 since Labour is the incumbent
party throughout the 2005–09 period, the ﬁrst model in each set is a binomial logit of Labour
versus all other parties voting.30 This model investigates the basic decision whether to
(continue to) support the governing party. The second model is a multinomial logit
speciﬁcation of intending to vote for various opposition parties (Conservative, Liberal
Democrat, other parties), with Labour support as the reference category. This model assesses
which factors are important for prompting voters to opt for various opposition parties.
Our modelling strategy begins with a baseline speciﬁcation that involves only a lagged
endogenous variable:
Vote Labourt ¼ fnðaþ b1Vote Labourt1Þ ð1aÞ
VoteConservative=Liberal Democrat=Other ¼ fnðaþ b1VoteConservativet1
þ b2Vote Liberal Democratt1 þ b3VoteOthert1Þ: ð1bÞ
We then add a series of predictor variables that capture various inﬂuences on party
support. The ﬁrst set of predictors includes standard demographic controls – age, gender,
26 To render all rival models comparable, for the four-wave models we combine observations made in
Waves 1, 2 and 3, using the most recent wave information available. For the three-wave models, using the
crime–rights scale, we make the same combination for Waves 1, 2 and 3 and drop information fromWave
5. The data are organized as a STATA ‘long’ dataset, with the data clustered by respondent.
27 Stephen Finkel, Causal Analysis with Panel Data (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1995).
28 Consider: Yt5 a1 g1Yt211 b1Xt1 et5Yt2g1Yt215 a1 b1Xt1 et. Assuming Yt is a stationary
process, g1 will be ,1.0, and Yt2g1Yt21 will be a partial difference. See, for example, Walter Enders,
Applied Econometric Time Series, 2nd edn (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2004).
29 Clarke, Sanders, Stewart and Whiteley, Performance Politics and the British Voter.
30 On the analysis of discrete choice models with lagged endogenous variables and large N, small T
panel data, see Jeffrey Wooldridge, Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 2002). Some dynamic discrete choice panel models are complex and raise difﬁcult
estimation issues; see, for example, Lorenzo Cappellari and Stephen P. Jenkins, ‘Modelling Low Income
Transitions’, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 19 (2004), 593–610. However, the models speciﬁed here are
quite straightforward. We assume the appropriateness of a time t21 lagged endogenous variable for
capturing individual-level inter-election dynamics in party support. Also, similar to conventional static
logit models of electoral choice, we do not assume unobserved heterogeneity among respondents. The
latter decision is consistent with the results of recent research using mixed logit models of electoral choice
in Britain; see Clarke, Sanders, Stewart and Whiteley, Performance Politics and the British Voter, chap. 5.
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education, trade union membership, social class and home ownership – all measured in
the ﬁrst panel wave. The second set of predictors, also measured in wave one, includes
controls for newspaper readership (dummy variables for readership of major national
daily newspapers), and for views (positive or negative on a ﬁve-point scale) of Britain’s
involvement in the war in Iraq. The predictors in the third set are measures of party
identiﬁcation. We construct dummy variables for identiﬁcation with Labour,
Conservative, Liberal Democrat and various other parties, with each of these variables
weighted by strength of identiﬁcation on a 1–3 scale.31
The fourth set of predictors taps spatial proximities. As anticipated above, we use two
different spatial measures – one for tax–services and one for crime–rights. Since the
crime–rights scale is available for fewer time points than the tax–services scale, we
estimate two different versions of the spatial model – one that includes tax–services only
and one that includes both tax–services and crime–rights.32 The ﬁfth set of predictors
assesses valence judgements about the three major parties. The variables are affect for
each of the three major party leaders; assessments of parties’ policy competence in four
major issue areas;33 and judgements regarding which party is best able to deal with the
most important problem facing Britain today.34
Finally, we specify a composite model that allows us to evaluate the explanatory power
of the various sets of predictor variables. For example, the composite model for Labour
versus all other party voting is:
Vote Labourt ¼ fnðaþ b1Vote Labourt1 þ
X
b24 Party Identificationt
þ
X
b57 Proximity to Parties on TaxSpend scalet
þ
X
b810 Proximity to Parties on CrimeRights scalet
þ
X
b1113 Leader Imagest þ
X
b1416 Party Best
þ
X
b1718 Party Competencet þ
X
b1926 Newpapers
þ b27 ðDisÞApprove Iraq Warþ
X
b28k DemographicsÞ; ð2Þ
where ‘leader images’ are affect scores on 0–10 scales, ‘party best’ is the party deemed
best able to deal with the most important issue facing Britain; ‘party competence’ refers
to the party’s ability to handle policy on the economy, the NHS, crime and terrorism,
and ‘newspapers’ is a series of dummy variables tapping newspaper readership patterns.
An equivalent multinomial logit model is employed to study opposition party voting.
31 Respondents stating that they identify ‘very strongly’ with a party are scored 3, those stating that
they identify ‘fairly strongly’ are scored 2, and those stating that they identify ‘not very strongly’ are
scored 1.
32 Each respondent was asked to rate both her/his own position and those of each of the three major
parties on both a 0–10 tax–services scale and a 0–10 crime–rights scale. The proximity of each respondent
to party X was measured as (10 – abs(respondent position minus party X position)).
33 The policy areas were the economy, the NHS, crime and terrorism.
34 The valence measures were constructed separately for each party and for each panel wave using
exploratory factor analysis. The Liberal Democrat valence measures were constructed solely from the
‘liking of party leader’ and ‘best party on most important issue’ variables, because respondents were not
asked only about the Liberal Democrat’s policy capacities in the speciﬁc areas listed in fn. 3. Detailed
information on variable construction is available from the authors on request.
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SPATIAL CALCULATIONS AND VALENCE JUDGEMENTS
In this article, a key claim is that, in a direct comparison, valence judgements can, and do,
substantially outperform spatial calculations in explaining vote choice. However, we also
acknowledge that valence judgements may be inﬂuenced by spatial considerations further
back in the funnel of causality. The idea is that voters’ ideal points on classic spatial issues
such as tax–spend and crime–rights tradeoffs and, a fortiori, on a more general ideological
continuum, such as the left–right dimension, are conditioned by basic value orientations
that are reﬂected in distances between those ideal points and perceived party locations.
Regarding the latter, the ‘issue ownership’ literature has long maintained that perceived
party locations reﬂect not only parties’ current attempts to position themselves
advantageously, but also the historically conditioned images that particular parties
develop as advocates and administrators in different policy domains.35 The end result is
that, at any time t, perceived distances between parties and voters provide the latter with
helpful cues for assessing how competing parties will handle salient issues. As argued
above, these issues typically have valence properties.
After performing possibly ‘rough and ready’ spatial calculations, voters sensibly
economize by using them as heuristic devices when assessing the performance of
competing parties. For example, a voter who considers that party X is distant from her/
his own spatial position will conclude that X is unable or unwilling to design and
implement policies that will further the achievement of valence politics goals of interest.
The very extremity of X’s position cues the voter that X is unlikely to provide effective
policy delivery for the valence issues that matter for that voter. By the same token, the
closer party X is to a voter’s ideal point, the more likely the voter is to conclude that
X will deliver effective policies on those issues. These cueing properties of spatial
calculations have the potential to make them important sources of valence judgements.
We investigate this conjecture by developing a set of valence models, one for each of the
three major parties. This requires, ﬁrst, that we construct a single valence index for each
party based on the various valence indicators that are used in Equation 2 above. The
valence indices for Labour and the Conservatives combine party leader evaluations,
assessments of the party best able to deal with the most important problem facing the
country, and evaluations of the prospective policy competence of a party with regard to
the economy, the NHS, crime and terrorism. Since the BES panel surveys did not ask
questions about likely Liberal Democrat policy performance, the valence index for the
Liberal Democrats is based on leader evaluations and best party only.36
When assessing the effects of spatial calculation in these analyses, we specify models
that, with the obvious exception of the spatial terms themselves, exclude the independent
variables employed in our vote equations. This enables us to use these same valence
equations when, as discussed below, we test for the weak exogeneity of valence with
35 See, for example, Ian Budge and Dennis Farlie, Voting and Party Competition (London and New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1977); D. Roderick Kiewiet, Macroeconomics & Micropolitics: The Electoral Effects of
Economic Issues (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); Judith Bara and Albert Weale, eds,Democratic
Politics and Party Competition: Essays in Honour of Ian Budge (New York: Routledge, 2006).
36 The valence index for each party is constructed as a 0–10 scale. Each component variable was
initially transformed to give it a range of 0–10. The indices were constructed by adding the component
scales together and dividing by 3 in the case of Labour and the Conservatives and by 2 in the case of the
Liberal Democrats. These additive indices correlate very strongly with more elaborate scales derived from
factor analyses of the component variables on a wave-by-wave basis.
Downs, Stokes and the Dynamics of Electoral Choice 301
respect to the vote. In the models of Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat valence
assessments, we use six exogenous instrumental variables. The ﬁrst of these is a measure
of economic evaluations which combines prospective and retrospective judgements of the
economy at the personal and national levels. Previous research has demonstrated that
these evaluations have powerful impacts on assessments of the prospective managerial
capabilities of the major parties.37 Our expectation is that evaluations will be positively
associated with valence judgements of the incumbent party and negatively associated with
those of the opposition parties. To complement these cognitive evaluations of the
economy, we also include a variable that reﬂects strong negative emotions towards the
economy – a measure of whether respondents felt angry about recent economic
developments. Since this variable expresses negative emotions, the expectation is that the
signs on the coefﬁcients will be the opposite of those for economic evaluations.
The third, fourth and ﬁfth instruments are measures of trust in each of the three major
parties.38 The expectation is that valence judgements about each party should be
positively associated with the level of trust in that party. Finally, we include a measure of
attitudes towards the European Union (EU). The expectation here is that pro-EU
attitudes will be positively associated with valence judgements about pro-EU parties
(Labour and the Liberal Democrats) and negatively associated with valence judgements
about broadly Eurosceptic parties (here, the Conservatives).39 Other elements in the
valence model are the six spatial proximity variables employed in Equation 2. The
resulting model of valence judgments for party X is:
Party X Valence Judgementst ¼ fnðaþ b1PartyX ValenceJudgmentst1
þ
X
b24 Party Trustt
þ b5 Economic Evaluationstþ b6 Economic Angert
þ b7Pro-Europe scale positiont
þ
X
b810 Proximity to Parties on TaxSpend scalet
þ
X
b1113 Proximity to Parties on CrimeRights scaletÞ:
ð3Þ
Exogeneity Tests
In suggesting that valence judgements are determined in part by spatial proximities,
whereas valence judgements have a powerful impact on vote, we propose the existence
of a recursive causal chain in which: (1) proximities affect valence judgements and
(2) valence judgements affect vote. This claim requires us to address the question of
possible simultaneity biases and attendant model mis-speciﬁcation. To justify estimating
parameters in a model for (1), we need to demonstrate the weak exogeneity of spatial
37 See, for example, David Sanders and Neil Gavin, ‘Television News, Economic Perceptions and
Political Preferences in Britain, 1997–2001’, Journal of Politics, 64 (2004), 1245–66.
38 The question is: ‘Now, some questions about the political parties. Please use the 0–10 scale to
indicate how much trust you have for each of the parties, where 0 means no trust and 10 means a great
deal of trust. How much do you trust the Labour Party? y the Conservative Party? y the Liberal
Democrat Party?’
39 See Geoffrey Evans, ‘Europe: A New Electoral Cleavage?’ in Geoffrey Evans and Pippa Norris, eds.,
Critical Elections: British Parties and Voters in Long-Term Perspective (London: Sage Publications, 1999),
pp. 207–22.
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proximities to valence judgements.40 To justify (2), we similarly need to demonstrate the
weak exogeneity of valence judgements with respect to the vote. We provide these
justiﬁcations by conducting Hausman tests.41 These tests involve estimating equations for
each putative weakly exogenous variable using appropriate instrumental variables. Results
are reported in Appendix 1. They clearly support the inferences that issue proximities are
weakly exogenous to valence judgements and valence judgements are weakly exogenous to
vote. These results imply that the model speciﬁcations presented in Equations 2 and 3 can be
estimated without risking simultaneity bias.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 3 provides summary statistics for a range of rival models of vote choice. Recall that
tax–spend spatial scales are available for four data waves and crime/rights scales are
available for three waves. The table accordingly differentiates between models that
include only tax–services (Panel A, N5 6,768) and those that include both tax–services
and crime–rights (Panel B, N5 4,260).42 Model 1 in each panel includes only a single
lagged endogenous variable, as in Equation 1a, or multiple lagged endogenous variables,
as in Equation 1b. Model 2 in each panel includes the relevant lagged endogenous
variables together with demographic controls (age, gender, education, trade-union
membership, social class and home ownership). Model 3 includes a further set of controls
for newspaper readership and attitudes towards the Iraq War. Similarly, Model 4 focuses
on partisanship; Model 5 on spatial proximities; and Model 6 on valence considerations.
Model 7 is a composite that includes all of the independent variables, as in Equation 3. As
noted above, the Labour voting models are estimated using binomial logit. Models for
choices among opposition parties are estimated using multinomial logit with Labour as
the reference category.
The three sets of summary ﬁt statistics displayed in Table 3 all point to the same
conclusions. Recalling that lower AIC and BIC statistics indicate superior model ﬁt,43 it is
clear that Models 2 to 7 offer improvements over the Model 1 baseline. But the extent of
improvement varies widely. For example, the improvement afforded by demographics
(Model 2) is extremely modest – a mere 0.01 improvement in the McFadden R2 and very
small reductions in AIC and BIC. The newspaper readership/Iraq War control model
(Model 3) does not fare much better. In contrast, the spatial proximities model (Model 5)
exhibits considerably more explanatory power (e.g., the McFadden R2 rises to 0.48 in the
Panel B model for Labour, with commensurate reductions in AIC and BIC). Yet the
spatial models do not perform as well as either the pure party identiﬁcation models
(Model 4) or the valence models (Model 6). Indeed, the statistics summarized in Table 3
40 See Wojeich Charemza and Derek F. Deadman, New Directions in Econometric Practice (Aldershot,
Surrey: Edward Elgar, 1997). On a related note, see David Sanders, Harold D. Clarke, Marianne C.
Stewart and Paul Whiteley, ‘The Endogeneity of Preferences in Spatial Models: Evidence from the 2005
British Election Study’, Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 18 (2008), 413–31.
41 See, for example, Wooldridge, Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, pp. 118–22.
42 The models with only tax/services effectively cover three panel waves, since one case per panellist is
lost because of the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable. The models with both tax–services and
crime–rights effectively cover two panel waves.
43 See Kenneth P. Burnham and David R. Anderson, Model Selection and Multimodel Inference: A
Practical Information-theoretic Approach, 2nd edn (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2002). ‘AIC’ is the
Akaike Information Criterion; ‘BIC’ is the Bayesian Information Criterion.
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TABLE 3 Summary Statistics for Rival Vote Intention Models
Binomial Logit: Labour vs.
Other Party Voting
Multinomial Logit Conservative, Liberal
Democrat, Other Party vs. Labour Voting
R2* AIC BIC R2* AIC BIC
Panel A: Models including only Tax/Spend Scales
Lagged endogenous variable only 0.38 5,014 5,028 0.36 11,440 11,522
Demographic controls plus lagged endogenous variable 0.39 4,986 5,068 0.37 11,322 11,609
Media/Iraq controls plus lagged endogenous variable 0.42 4,748 4,823 0.39 10,935 11,201
Party identiﬁcation plus lagged endogenous variable 0.59 3,304 3,338 0.54 8,172 8,315
Spatial proximities plus lagged endogenous variable 0.46 4,393 4,427 0.43 10,170 10,313
Valence judgements plus lagged endogenous variable 0.66 2,778 2,846 0.63 6,650 6,896
Composite model 0.72 2,363 2,602 0.69 5,797 6,554
Panel B: Models including Tax–Spend and Crime–Rights Scales
Lagged dependent variable only 0.35 3,395 3,408 0.33 7,576 7,653
Demographic controls plus lagged dependent variable 0.36 3,372 3,449 0.34 7,474 7,741
Media/Iraq controls plus lagged endogenous variable 0.40 3,151 3,221 0.37 7,196 7,444
Party identiﬁcation plus lagged endogenous variable 0.61 2,045 2,077 0.56 5,033 5,166
Spatial proximities plus lagged endogenous variable 0.48 2,739 2,790 0.46 6,165 6,356
Valence judgements plus lagged dependent variable 0.66 1,827 1,890 0.63 4,294 4,523
All combined 0.72 1,510 1,752 0.70 3,659 4,421
Notes: Panel A: Models including only Tax–Spend Scales: N5 6,768; Clusters (individuals), 2,711. Panel B: Models including Tax–Spend and
Crime–Rights Scales: N5 4,260; Clusters (individuals), 2,351. *McFadden R2.
3
0
4
S
A
N
D
E
R
S,
C
L
A
R
K
E
,
S
T
E
W
A
R
T
A
N
D
W
H
I
T
E
L
E
Y
testify that the valence model clearly outperforms all of its rivals, consistently exhibiting
the highest pseudo R2 values and lowest AIC/BIC scores.
However, there is more to the story. Table 3 shows that the composite model (Model 7)
which includes variables from each of the rival models outperforms any of the individual
rivals. The McFadden R2 values for the composite model are typically 6 to 9 points
greater than the best individual model, again with correspondingly lower AIC and BIC
scores. This result indicates that there is potentially a role in the determination of vote
choice for any or all of the different explanatory factors identiﬁed in Equation 3. To
evaluate the relative importance of the different factors, it is necessary to go beyond
overall model ﬁt statistics to consider the impact of individual predictor variables.
Table 4 reports the results of estimating Equation 2 for both Labour voting (Panel A)
and for the choice among opposition parties (Panel B). The estimation procedure clusters
the data by individual panel respondent and provides robust standard errors. Note that
because of the inclusion of various lags in the models, the effective number of cases is
4,260, representing some 2,351 individuals. Models that exclude the crime–rights variables
(available for only three data waves) yield more effective cases without substantially
affecting any of the reported coefﬁcients.44
The statistics in Table 4 adjudicate the competing claims of the rival theories of voter
choice. Consider the coefﬁcients and standard errors reported in Panel A, which concerns
determinants of Labour vote choice. Bearing in mind that including a lagged dependent
variable means that the model effectively explains partial changes in Labour support from
time t21 to time t, several conclusions are apparent. First, all of the coefﬁcients for the
lagged endogenous variable and the partisanship terms are signiﬁcant and in the predicted
direction: positive in the case of Labour vote at t21 and Labour partisanship; and negative
in the case of Conservative and Liberal Democrat partisanship. Secondly, most coefﬁcients
for the two sets of control variables are not statistically signiﬁcant (pr 0.05). None of the
newspaper readership variables achieves signiﬁcance, implying that changes in Labour
voting intentions after 2005 owed little or nothing to exposure to information in particular
newspapers. The Iraq War control term is positive (approval of the war disposed people to
shift towards Labour), although not quite signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
Regarding demographic controls, older people tended to move away from Labour more
than did their younger counterparts (i.e., the age coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant and negative,
b520.02). Three of the occupational class variables also produced small negative effects:
compared with the base class category (‘never worked’), professional/managerial, clerical/
sales and manual workers tended to move away from Labour after 2005. However, it bears
emphasis that these effects are very modest in their substantive implications. Recall from
Table 3 that demographic factors added little explanatory power to the baseline lagged
endogenous variable model, the increase in R2 being only 0.01.
The most important ﬁndings in Panel A concern the valence and spatial variables.
Three of the six spatial variables in Panel A exhibit signiﬁcant effects. Proximity to
Labour on the tax/services scale correctly produces a signiﬁcant positive effect (b5 0.15),
whereas proximity to the Conservatives has the anticipated negative effect (b520.08).
However, the third signiﬁcant spatial coefﬁcient – proximity to the Conservatives on
crime–rights – is incorrectly signed. The positive coefﬁcient (b5 0.10) counter-intuitively
suggests that, as people drew close to the Conservatives on crime–rights, the more likely
44 Results are available from the authors on request.
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TABLE 4 Binomial and Multinomial Logit Vote Intention Models
Binomial logit
Labour voting
Multinomial logit opposition parties voting
(Labour as reference category)
Labour government
choice/not
Conservative
opposition choice
Liberal Democrat
opposition choice
Other party
opposition choice
b SE b SE b SE b SE
Lagged endogenous variables and partisanship
Labour votet21 1.76*** 0.16
Conservativet21 2.09*** 0.33 1.22*** 0.29 1.28*** 0.29
Lib Demt21 0.84* 0.35 2.37*** 0.24 0.93*** 0.28
Other Votet21 0.63 0.36 0.79** 0.30 2.34*** 0.24
Labour identiﬁcationt 1.03*** 0.10 21.17*** 0.18 20.86*** 0.11 21.21***
Cons identiﬁcationt 20.69** 0.23 0.86*** 0.26 0.02 0.28 20.31 0.28
Lib Dem identiﬁcationt 20.97*** 0.23 20.16 0.36 1.34*** 0.26 20.48 0.36
Valence terms
Labour leader ratingst 0.24*** 0.04 20.33*** 0.05 20.20*** 0.05 20.26*** 0.04
Cons leader ratingst 20.05 0.04 0.36*** 0.06 20.09 0.06 0.07 0.05
Lib-Dem leader ratingst 20.12** 0.04 20.02 0.06 0.29*** 0.05 0.03 0.05
Labour best on most important problemt 1.05*** 0.21 21.86*** 0.56 20.96*** 0.26 21.04*** 0.28
Cons best on most important problemt 20.48 0.36 0.87* 0.38 20.13 0.38 20.83* 0.41
Lib-Dems best on most important problemt 20.85* 0.40 20.82 0.59 1.34*** 0.36 20.47 0.43
Labour handling of key issuest 0.73*** 0.13 20.90*** 0.20 20.48*** 0.15 20.89*** 0.16
Conservative handling of key issuest 20.31* 0.13 1.11*** 0.19 0.45*** 0.16 0.05 0.15
Spatial terms
Proximity to Labour on tax–services scalet 0.15** 0.05 20.22*** 0.07 20.16** 0.06 20.15** 0.06
Proximity to Cons on tax–services scalet 20.08* 0.04 0.22*** 0.07 0.11* 0.04 0.02 0.05
Proximity to Lib-Dems on tax–services scalet 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.07 20.06 0.06
Proximity to Labour on crime–rights scalet 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.05 20.02 0.05 20.07 0.05
Proximity to Cons on crime–rights scalet 0.10* 0.04 20.00 0.07 20.14** 0.05 20.06 0.05
Proximity to Lib-Dems on crime–rights scalet 0.00 0.04 20.10 0.05 0.10* 0.05 20.05 0.05
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TABLE 4 (Continued)
Media/Iraq controls
Telegraph readert1 0.26 0.45 20.07 0.51 20.56 0.51 0.17 0.46
Mail reader t1 0.29 0.31 20.02 0.36 20.33 0.30 20.25 0.35
Express reader t1 0.07 0.35 20.26 0.48 0.26 0.44 20.08 0.42
Guardian reader t1 0.32 0.33 20.90 0.56 20.27 0.35 20.53 0.43
Independent reader t1 0.49 0.52 21.28 0.74 20.66 0.48 20.16 0.58
Mirror reader t1 0.31 0.23 20.19 0.34 20.17 0.27 20.46 0.27
Sun reader t1 0.13 0.27 0.04 0.36 20.17 0.35 20.23 0.22
Times reader t1 20.15 0.32 0.19 0.40 0.31 0.35 20.23 0.40
Attitude towards UK involvement in Iraqt1 0.12 0.07 20.05 0.09 20.13 0.08 20.13 0.08
Demographic controls
Male 0.15 0.16 20.29 0.23 20.21 0.19 0.02 0.20
Age 20.02** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02* 0.01 0.02* 0.01
Owner occupier 0.33 0.19 20.13 0.26 20.32 0.22 20.41 0.22
Education (years) 20.12 0.07 0.25** 0.09 0.17* 0.08 0.04 0.08
Graduate 20.13 0.21 20.13 0.28 0.06 0.24 0.28 0.25
Union member 20.05 0.17 0.37 0.25 0.01 0.21 0.01 0.20
Prof/managerial 20.80** 0.30 0.92* 0.44 0.82* 0.37 0.80* 0.37
Clerical/sales 20.92** 0.31 1.09** 0.44 0.73* 0.37 1.29*** 0.37
Manual working class 20.87** 0.32 0.71 0.46 0.73* 0.37 1.28*** 0.37
Petty bourgeoisie 20.52 0.53 0.34 0.46 0.49 0.61 0.77 0.59
Constant 4.69*** 0.84 2.83* 1.14 21.05 0.97 4.68*** 0.95
McFadden R2 0.72 0.70
*pr 0.05; **pr 0.01; ***pr 0.001.
Note: Reference category for occupational class is never worked/other. N5 4,260; clusters (individuals)5 2,351; robust standard errors
reported.
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they were to support Labour. Neither of the spatial variables for the Liberal Democrats
approaches signiﬁcance.
The performance of valence variables in the Labour model is quite straightforward.
Although a small number of these variables fail to achieve statistical signiﬁcance, all are
correctly signed – the signs for all the Labour valence variables are positive and all of
those for the Conservative and Liberal Democrat terms are negative. The Labour
leadership coefﬁcient is sizeable, signiﬁcant and positive (b5 0.24), suggesting that an
important reason for the decline in Labour’s support since 2005 involved the declining
ratings of party leaders Blair and Brown. As also expected, the Liberal Democrat
leadership coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant and negative (b520.12).
Regarding party performance on important issues, the effect of the ‘Labour best’ variable
on voting for that party is predictably positive and signiﬁcant (b51.05) and that for Liberal
Democrats is negative and signiﬁcant (b520.85). The effect of Conservative valence
judgements on Labour voting appears to operate through the overall policy competence
measure. As expected, the effect of Labour policy competence is positive and signiﬁcant
(b5 0.73), but there is also a signiﬁcant negative effect produced by Conservative policy
competence (b520.31). Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest that the decline in Labour
support after 2005 was partly a function of growing perceptions that the party had faltered,
especially on the economy, but also partly a result of the Conservatives’ ability to convince
some voters that the party could perform soundly in key policy areas.
Panel B of Table 4 tells a similar story to Panel A. Most of the media and demographic
control variables for the Conservatives, Liberal Democrats and other parties are not
signiﬁcant, although there are a few exceptions. Party identiﬁcation coefﬁcients are
generally signiﬁcant and are correctly signed. For example, for Conservative voting,
Conservative partisanship is positively signed, Labour partisanship is negatively signed
and Liberal Democrat partisanship is correctly signed but not signiﬁcant. And, similar to
Panel A of this table, the spatial coefﬁcients present a somewhat inconsistent picture. For
Conservative voting, the Labour and Conservative tax–services variables are signiﬁcant
and correctly signed (negative and positive, respectively). None of the other four variables
has a signiﬁcant effect. For Liberal Democrat voting, three of the six spatial terms are
signiﬁcant and correctly signed, although one (for Conservative policy competence) is
signiﬁcant and perversely signed. Regarding voting for other parties, only the Labour
tax–services coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant and correctly (negatively) signed.
Once more, most coefﬁcients for the valence variables are consistent with expectations. Of
the eight valence coefﬁcients for Conservative voting, six are signiﬁcant and correctly signed.
For Liberal Democrat voting, ﬁve coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant and correctly signed. Finally, four
of the valence coefﬁcients for other party voting are signiﬁcant and all are correctly signed.
Since logit coefﬁcients are not easily interpreted,45 we compute changes in the probability
of voting for various parties when each of the spatial and valence predictor variables is moved
from its minimum to its maximum value, holding all other variables constant at their
means.46 The largest changes in probabilities (Dp values) are those associated with the valence
variables (see Table 5, Panel A). None of the spatial proximities produces a change in
45 See J. Scott Long, Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables (Beverly Hills,
Calif.: Sage Publications, 1997).
46 Probabilities are computed using the CLARIFY program. See Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg and
Gary King, CLARIFY: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results (Cambridge, Mass.:
Department of Government, Harvard University, 1999).
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TABLE 5 Changes in Vote Intention Probabilities Associated With Various Predictor Variables
Change in probability (Dp) of votingy.
Rangey Labour Conservative
Liberal
Democrat
Panel A
Labour leadership 0–10 10.26 20.29 20.04
Conservative leadership 0–10 20.04 10.66 20.44
Lib Dem leadership 0–10 20.09 20.26 10.55
Labour best on most important issue 0–1 10.10 20.18 20.02
Conservative best on most important issue 0–1 20.03 10.24 20.06
Lib Dem best on most important issue 0–1 20.04 20.20 10.40
Labour prospective performance on key issues 1–5 10.28 20.30 10.06
Conservatives prospective performance on key issues 1–5 20.10 10.62 20.01
Proximity to Labour on tax–services 0–10 10.08 20.21 20.02
Proximity to Conservatives on tax–services 0–10 20.07 10.27 10.08
Proximity to Lib Democrats on tax–services 0–10 10.03 10.08 10.03
Proximity to Labour on crime–rights 0–10 10.02 10.10 0.00
Proximity to Conservatives on crime–rights 0–10 10.06 10.14 20.27
Proximity to Lib Democrats on crime–rights 0–10 0.00 20.25 0.30
Panel B
Labour leader plus Labour prospective performance on key issues 0–10, 1–5 0.66 20.47 20.47
Conservative leader plus Conservative prospective performance on
key issues
0–10, 1–5 20.13 10.93 10.93
Proximity to Labour on tax–services plus proximity to Labour on
crime–rights
0–10, 0–10 10.10 20.11 20.11
Proximity to Conservatives on tax–services plus proximity to
Conservatives on crime–rights
0–10, 0–10 0.00 10.35 10.35
Proximity to Lib Dems on tax–services plus proximity to Lib Dems
on crime–rights
0–10, 0–10 0.02 20.13 0.13
y Range: change in each of the predictor variables used for calculating changes in vote probabilities.
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probability of voting for any of the parties greater than 0.30, and only four of the eighteen
changes are greater than 0.20. In contrast, half of the Dp values for the valence variables are
greater than 0.20, and six of them exceed 0.40. For Conservative voting, a shift from 0 to10
on the party’s leader scale increases the probability of voting for the party by 0.66. Similarly,
an increase from 1 to 5 on the Conservative policy competence scale engenders a 0.62 increase
in the probability of voting for the party.
Panel B of Table 5 illustrates changes in vote probabilities associated with combinations of
changes in valence and spatial measures. Here the difference between valence and spatial
effects is even more pronounced. For example, a change in both Conservative leader
evaluations and Conservative policy competence judgements from their minimum to their
maximum values increases the probability of switching to the Conservatives by fully 0.93.
This is almost three times the size of the largest spatial combination (0.35) for the
combination of changes in Conservative tax–service proximity and Conservative crime–rights
proximity. These differences in changes in probability values testify to the dominance of
valence judgements over spatial proximities as direct determinants of vote choice.
Indirect Effects
As hypothesized above, spatial considerations may have additional, indirect effects on the vote
by virtue of their inﬂuence on valence judgements. Table 6 reports the results of estimating
Equation 3 for each of the three main parties. Since the dependent variables are all 0–10 scales,
estimation is by Ordinary Least Squares regression, with robust standard errors being
calculated since the data are clustered by respondent. The models are reasonably well
determined, with R2 values ranging from 0.32 for Liberal Democrat valence judgements to 0.66
for Conservative valence judgements and 0.71 for Labour ones.47 The values of the spatial
coefﬁcients offer strong support for the hypothesized spatial calculation-to-valence judgements
causal linkage. In the three models, all coefﬁcients are correctly signed, and seventeen out of
twenty-one are statistically signiﬁcant. In every case, the proximity terms for the party whose
support is being analysed have positive coefﬁcients while the proximity terms for the competing
parties have negative ones. For example, in the Labour model, both Labour spatial variables –
tax–services and crime–rights – have positive coefﬁcients, whereas the comparable coefﬁcients
for Conservative and Liberal Democrat voting are negative. And, as just noted, a large majority
of these coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant (p,0.001 in all cases). All spatial coefﬁcients are
signiﬁcant in the Labour model; four out of six are signiﬁcant in the Conservative model; and
ﬁve out of six in the Liberal Democrat one. There is a clear contrast between this strong and
consistent pattern for spatial effects on valence judgements in Table 6, and the weaker, more
variable direct effects of spatial variables on voting intentions (see Tables 4 and 5). This contrast
lends additional credence to the conjecture that a hitherto neglected component of the inﬂuence
of spatial calculations on voting behaviour is indirect, operating through valence judgements.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: DOWNS AND STOKES RECONSIDERED
Recent studies of voting behaviour in Britain, Canada and the United States have
demonstrated that valence models outperform spatial rivals in analyses of electoral choice.
To the extent that these studies have considered individual-level changes in party support, they
47 The lower R2 value for the Liberal Democrats could reﬂect the more restricted measure of valence
used for that party. Recall that the questions about policy competence in four key areas, which form part
of Labour and Conservative valence measures, were not asked for the Liberal Democrats.
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TABLE 6 The Impact of Spatial Proximities on Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat Valence Judgements
Labour valence Conservative valence Lib Democrat valence
b SE b SE b SE
Labour valence judgementst21 0.48*** 0.02
Conservative valence judgementst21 0.54*** 0.03
Lib Dems valence judgementst21 0.33*** 0.02
Proximity to Labour on tax–services 0.08*** 0.02 20.08** 0.03 20.06*** 0.02
Proximity to Conservatives on tax–services 20.07*** 0.02 0.12*** 0.02 20.06*** 0.02
Proximity to Lib Democrats on tax–services 20.03 0.02 20.04 0.03 0.12*** 0.02
Proximity to Labour on crime–rights 0.12*** 0.02 20.07*** 0.02 20.07*** 0.01
Proximity to Conservatives on crime–rights 20.02* 0.01 0.14*** 0.02 20.01 0.01
Proximity to Lib Democrats on crime–rights 20.06*** 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.11*** 0.01
Trust in Labour party 0.21*** 0.02 20.02 0.02 20.05*** 0.02
Trust in Conservative party 20.02 0.01 0.20*** 0.03 0.00 0.01
Trust in Liberal Democrat party 20.02 0.01 20.02 0.02 0.17*** 0.02
Economic evaluations 0.29*** 0.04 0.10 0.05 20.03 0.05
Angry emotions towards the economy 20.03 0.03 20.10* 0.04 20.07 0.03
Pro-European attitudes 0.03*** 0.01 0.03** 0.01 0.01 0.01
Constant 0.21 0.18 0.46* 0.22 1.04 0.18
R2 0.71 0.66 0.32
*pr 0.05; **pr 0.01; ***pr 0.001.
Note: N5 4,612, clusters5 2,979; robust standard errors reported.
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have focused heavily on the ofﬁcial ‘short’ campaign periods preceding general elections. In
this article, we have extended this line of research by investigating the dynamics of party
support in the British case over the ‘long campaign’ period between 2005 and 2009. Newly
available BES multi-wave panel data reveal that the valence politics model outperforms its
spatial competitor in terms of direct effects on changes in vote intentions over this four-year
period. However, spatial effects do not disappear when valence considerations are controlled –
a composite model that includes both types of variables has the strongest explanatory power.
Another important ﬁnding is that spatial calculations act as a source of valence judgements.
The hypothesis considered is that Downs undergirds Stokes – voters use spatial calculations as
heuristic devices when assessing party competence. Parties viewed as closer than their
competitors to voters in spatial terms are more likely to be judged as credible vehicles for
achieving widely shared policy goals such as economic prosperity, health care and public safety.
Analyses are consistent with this spatial cueing hypothesis. Tests for the weak exogeneity of
spatial calculations with respect to valence judgements, and of valence judgements with respect
to vote intentions, lend conﬁdence that the results are not statistical artefacts.
These ﬁndings have signiﬁcant substantive implications, suggesting that the dynamics of
British party support after 2005 can be understood in terms of the interplay of valence and
positional politics. One important consideration is that Labour lost its leadership advantage
over the Conservatives. After an initial burst of enthusiasm, voters quickly soured on Blair’s
successor, Gordon Brown. In contrast, although new Conservative leader, David Cameron
was not greeted with great warmth, he ran well ahead of his predecessor, Michael Howard,
and, more importantly, well ahead of Brown. With Cameron at the helm, the leadership
heuristic was no longer a barrier to his party’s electoral success. The Conservatives also
managed to reinvigorate their reputation for managerial competence and, although their
share of partisans increased only very slightly in absolute terms, Labour’s cohort of identiﬁers
dropped by nearly 10 per cent. Consistent with the valence politics model’s claim that party
identiﬁcation has dynamic properties, over two-ﬁfths of the BES panellists reported changing
their partisanship one or more times between 2005 and 2009.
Finally, there were forces at work consistent with the spatial cueing hypothesis. The
Conservatives’ move towards the political centre under Cameron, in conjunction with moves
by voters on the tax–spend scale that worked to reduce their distance from his party, played
an indirect role in restoring his party’s electoral fortunes. This shift to the centre helped
persuade voters that the Conservatives could deal competently with challenges concerning
the economy, public services and public safety. In turn, these valence judgements about
prospective policy performance were a motor of increasing Conservative support.
In conclusion, the major message of this article is that both spatial and valence considerations
have consequential effects on electoral choice. Spatial variables have both direct and indirect
effects on the vote, but their direct effects are substantially weaker than those of their valence
rivals. Thus, it is not surprising that the core terrain on which parties typically ﬁght general
elections involves valence judgements. A party’s best interests lie in convincing the electorate of its
competence in the three key policy areas of the economy, public services and public safety – and
in contriving to tarnish the corresponding competence images of competing parties. Valence
politics is not the exclusive preserve of the British voter. Rather, as recent studies in Canada and
the United States underscore, valence considerations powerfully inﬂuence electoral choice in other
mature democracies. What is less well understood is the relationship between valence judgements
and spatial calculations and, in particular, whether there are cueing effects of the latter on the
former, such as those operating in the British case. In the years ahead, the growing
availability of high quality multi-wave panel data in a variety of countries should enable
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researchers to pursue these theoretically interesting topics central to understanding the
dynamics of party support in broader comparative perspective.
APPEND IX 1 : EXOGENE I TY TE ST S
Hausman tests for (weak) exogeneity involve the use of two equations – one for the dependent
variable itself and one for the explanatory variable that is hypothesized to be weakly exogenous to
the dependent variable.48 The test requires that the equation for the predictor variable contains at
least one instrumental variable that is not included in the equation for the dependent variable. In
our case, we have several such instruments in each of our Hausman tests.
Our models of the vote intention–valence judgement relationship are:
Vote for Party Xt ¼ fðVote for Party Xt1;Labour Valence Judgementst;
Conservative Valence Judgementst;Liberal Democrat Valence Judgementst;
Labour Spatial Proximitiest;Conservative Spatial Proximitiest;
Liberal Democrat Spatial Proximitiest;Labour Identificationt;
Conservative Identificationt;LiberalDemocrat Identificationt;
Media=IraqControlst1;Demographic Controlst1Þ: ðA1Þ
Valence of Party Xt ¼ fðValence of Party Xt1;Trust in Labourt1;Trust in
Conservativest1;Trust in Liberal Democratst1;
Economic Evaluationst;EconomicAngert;Pro=anti Europe t1Þ: ðA2Þ
The test consists in regressing vote intentions on all the exogenous variables in both equations.
Residuals from this regression are then added to the vote-intention equations reported in Table 4. If
these residuals yield non-signiﬁcant coefﬁcients, then we conclude that the valence measures are weakly
exogenous to vote intentions. The intuition here is that if the unexplained variance in valence is
unrelated to vote intentions (which it must be if the residual terms are non-signiﬁcant), then estimates
of the impact of valence in the vote intention equation do not suffer from simultaneity bias.
Table A1 reports results. Parameters in the Labour vote intentions are estimated by binomial logistical
regression, and the choice among opposition parties (Conservative, Liberal Democrat, other party
voting, with Labour voting as the reference category), by multinomial logistic regression. Residuals from
the Labour valence-judgements equation are added to the Labour equation only. Since there is no
valence term for ‘other’ parties, in the multinomial logit only residuals from the Conservative and Liberal
Democrat valence equation are added. As the table indicates, all the residual terms in both equations are
non-signiﬁcant. This result indicates that valence calculations are weakly exogenous to vote.
The Hausman tests for the exogeneity of spatial proximities to valence are slightly more com-
plicated than those presented in Table A1. This is because we need to specify equations for
proximities on both tax–services and crime–rights. The instruments that we use in the tax–services
equations are the respondents’ family income, her/his sense that s/he is treated fairly by government
and her/his sense of relative deprivation.49 The model for tax–services proximities is:
Tax2Services Proximity to Party Xt ¼ fðTax2Services Proximity to Party Xt1;
Income; Perceived Government Fairness;
Relative DeprivationÞ: ðA3Þ
48 See, for example, Charemza and Deadman, New Directions in Econometric Practice; Wooldridge,
Econometric Analysis.
49 Income is measured on an 11-point scale corresponding to eleven income bands. Government
fairness is a 5-point scale reﬂecting the degree of agreement/disagreement with the statement: ‘The
Government generally treats people like me fairly.’ Relative deprivation is measured as a 5-point scale
reﬂecting the degree of agreement/disagreement with the statement: ‘There is often a big gap between
what people like me expect out of life and what we actually get.’
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In the crime–rights models, we add further instruments of attention to politics, personal political
efﬁcacy and sense of civic duty.50 This gives:
CrimeRights Proximity to Party Xt ¼ fðCrimeRights Proximity to Party Xt1; Income;
Perceived Government Fairness; Relative Deprivation;
Attention to Politics; Efficacy; Civic DutyÞ: ðA4Þ
The valence model is the same as that given in Equation A2. The Hausman tests for spatial
proximity exogeneity consist in (a) regressing tax–services proximities for party X on all the exo-
genous variables in Equations A2 and A3 and holding the residuals in XResTax; (b) regressing
crime–rights proximities for party X on all the exogenous variables in Equations A2 and A4 and
holding the residuals in XResCrime; (c) estimating Equation A2 with the addition of XResTax and
XResCrime as predictors. Again, if the residual terms are non-signiﬁcant at stage (c), then spatial
proximities are weakly exogenous to valence and we are justiﬁed in estimating Equation A2.
Table A2 reports signiﬁcance levels of the relevant residual terms in the Labour, Conservative
and Liberal Democrat models. As the results indicate, all predictors are non-signiﬁcant in all
models, strongly supporting the notion that spatial calculation is weakly exogenous to valence
judgements.
TABLE A1 Hausman Test Results: Effects of Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat
Valence Judgement Residuals in Logit and Multinomial Vote Intention Models
Labour* Conservativey Lib-Demy Othery
b SE p b SE p b SE p b SE p
Labour valence residuals 0.11 0.07 0.11
Conservative valence residuals 0.18 0.13 0.16 0.04 0.10 0.67 0.09 0.08 0.22
Lib-Dem valence residuals 0.39 0.26 0.13 0.05 0.21 0.79 20.13 0.20 0.52
* Labour – not binomial model. y Opposition – multinomial logit model (base category is Labour).
TABLE A2 Hausman Test Results: Effects of Tax–Services and Crime–Rights Residuals in
Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat Valence Judgement Models
Labour Valence
Equation
Conservative Valence
Equation
Lib Dem Valence
Equation
b SE p b SE p b SE p
Lab tax–services residuals 20.08 0.05 0.13
Lab crime–rights residuals 20.02 0.04 0.63
Cons tax–services residuals 20.05 0.08 0.55
Cons crime–rights residuals 20.10 0.07 0.14
L-D tax–services residuals 20.00 0.04 0.93
L-D crime–rights residuals 0.00 0.04 0.96
50 Attention is measured on a 0–10 point scale: ‘On a scale of 0 to 10 how much attention do you
generally pay to politics?’ Political efﬁcacy is a 0–10 scale: ‘On a scale from 0 to 10 where 10 means a great
deal of inﬂuence and 0 means no inﬂuence, how much inﬂuence do you have on politics and public
affairs?’ Civic duty is 5-point Likert scale reﬂecting the degree of agreement/disagreement with the
statement: ‘I would be seriously neglecting my duty as a citizen if I didn’t vote.’
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